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In this paper I examine Michael Devitt’s version of essentialism, a view 
that stirred a lot of debate amongst philosophers of biology by going 
against the mainstream view of “death of essentialism” in evolutionary 
biology. So far, much more attention was directed to refuting Devitt’s 
view then to analyzing what his essentialism consists in. I go through 
the main tenets of the essentialist view, examine the relation between 
Devitt’s view and the so-called traditional essentialism, and the cluster 
approaches to natural kinds. I conclude that Devitt holds a very fl exible 
variety of pluralistic essentialism, that I term promiscuous essentialism. 
The benefi t of holding such a view is that it can encompass a wide range 
of categories, but its downside is that knowing the essence of a kind can 
be minimally explanatory. For this reason, the criterion for privileging 
certain kinds cannot follow from identifying their essence, which was 
originally one of the main motivations for holding an essentialist view.
Keywords: Natural kinds, species, essentialism, pluralism, philoso-
phy of biology, cluster kinds.
1. Introduction
Michael Devitt in his thought-provoking paper “Resurrecting Biologi-
cal Essentialism” argues that species and Linnean taxa more generally 
have essences that are, at least partly, constituted by intrinsic proper-
ties (Devitt 2008a). Many philosophers of biology reacted to his view by 
defending the near consensus view, according to which, at least when 
it comes to species, there is no place for essentialism in biology (Barker 
2010; Ereshefsky 2010; Lewens 2012). Most of the reactions did not 
refl ect upon Devitt’s version of essentialism as being somehow specifi c 
or different from the traditional variety. In this regard, Marc Ereshef-
sky’s (2010) discussion presents an exemption. He identifi es Devitt’s 
view as belonging to “new biological essentialism”, but does not discuss 
what traditional essentialism consists in, and how the new biological 
essentialism differs from it. The aim of this paper is to offer an analysis 
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of Devitt’s essentialism and to situate it in the taxonomy of possible 
essentialist positions and examine its relation to cluster kinds view of 
natural kinds.
Essentialism is normally taken to have three core tenets: (1) all and 
only kind members possess a common essence; (2) essence causes traits 
typically associated with kind members; and (3) identifying an essence 
helps us to explain and predict traits associated with kind members 
(Ereshefsky 2017). However, if we examine further the platitudes as-
sociated with the essentialist view we will fi nd two additional claims: 
(4) that essences ought to be intrinsic properties of kind members, as 
opposed to being extrinsic or relational ones, and (5) natural kind mo-
nism, i.e. the claim that there is one correct way of dividing the world 
into natural kinds1 (see, for instance, Wilkerson 1993). I will take these 
fi ve tenets to make up the traditional essentialist view.
In the next section, I will present some reasons for endorsing (4) 
and (5) in addition to the three basic essentialist tenets. After that, 
I will distinguish essentialist approaches from cluster approaches to 
natural kinds and argue that, regardless of some authors like Ereshef-
sky (2010) and perhaps even Devitt (2008a) who include them among 
essentialist views, they cannot be considered as such because they defy 
tenet (1) of essentialist positions. Thus, I will argue that if Devitt’s view 
is construed as essentialist then it cannot be considered as belonging 
to cluster approaches to natural kinds. Devitt does not elaborate much 
what is the specifi c brand of essentialism that he endorses. However, 
he does mention that Kripke’s (1980), Putnam’s (1975) and Wiggins’s 
(1980) type of essentialism represents a received view in philosophy, 
with the exception of philosophy of biology. Thus, I use this as evidence 
for interpreting what type of essentialism Devitt wishes to resurrect. I 
will use Putnam here as the relevant source and argue that both Devitt 
and Putnam endorse a pluralist version of essentialism, thereby deny-
ing tenet (5) of the traditional essentialist view. The I will argue that 
while for Putnam it is not entirely clear how broad his pluralist view is, 
it appears that Devitt’s essentialism is very encompassing. In fact, his 
essentialism seems so broad that it resembles John Dupré’s promiscu-
ous realism, which is why I term his view promiscuous essentialism. 
Finally, I will indicate some problematic consequences of such a view. 
Namely, Devitt’s essentialism seems to be so relaxed that the essence 
of a kind could be a property that plays a minimally explanatory role.
1 Natural kind monism is rarely explicitly stated in this form (although, see 
above quoted Willkerson) but can be found in accounts that emphasize that natural 
kinds should form a hierarchy; the view that there should be no cross-cutting kinds, 
and that if two kinds overlap one should be a subkind of the other (see, for instance, 
Ellis 2001). While in priciple, this hierarchy thesis is compatible with pluralism in 
case we have different hierarchical systems of natural kinds, normally it is assumed 
that there is one correct hierarchy, and that there should be no cross-cutting 
classifi cations whatsoever. This assumption will be taken for granted in the rest of 
the paper, but this issue is discussed further in section 2.
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2. Traditional essentialism
Essentialism requires that all and only members of a natural kind have 
a certain property—essence—which is, in turn, responsible for the traits 
characteristic for that kind. To illustrate, take Putnam’s famous exam-
ple that the essence of water is H2O. The molecular structure of water is 
what makes all instances of water members of the same kind. Moreover, 
this molecular structure is causally responsible for other, characteristic 
properties of water, such as being colorless, odorless and transparent. 
Thus, discovering the essence of a kind allows us to explain and predict 
properties of members of a kind. This sums up the three main tenets of 
essentialist views. Two further claims that have been typically associ-
ated with essentialism are (4) that essences ought to be intrinsic proper-
ties of kind members; and (5) natural kind monism.
With regards to (4), the paradigmatic examples of essentialist kinds 
are taken to have intrinsic properties. That is, properties associated 
with a natural kinds will be possessed by members of that kind inde-
pendently of their relation to other things (Ellis 2001; Wilkerson 1988). 
Take for instance chemical elements. It is taken that the essence of 
chemical elements is their atomic number, or, to be more specifi c, prop-
erties of the nucleus of atoms belonging to an element. Gold, for ex-
ample, has the atomic number 79, which means that it has 79 protons 
in the nucleus, and the same number of electrons in the extranuclear 
region of the atom. Since the chemical characteristics of gold (and other 
elements) are closely related to the number and arrangement of elec-
trons in their atoms, it is taken that elements are entirely distinguish-
able from each other by their atomic numbers.  The basic idea is that 
our scientifi c investigations of the world will lead to classifi cations that 
refl ect the discontinuities and boundaries between natural objects and 
processes. Thus, upon encountering an entity or process, and after ex-
amining its intrinsic properties, we should be able to decide to which 
kind(s) it belongs.
One reason for excluding extrinsic or relational properties as es-
sences of natural kinds is that very heterogeneous sets of entities can 
enter into the same relations and possess common extrinsic proper-
ties. Functional kinds, for instance, are defi ned by invoking relational 
or extrinsic properties; entities are classifi ed into a kind because of 
something they (can) do, a function they can serve, and not because of 
some intrinsic similarities. For instance, a watch is a functional kind 
because it is defi ned by its function to measure time. A watch can be 
digital, analog, mechanical, electronic, and so on and so forth. Objects 
made out of different materials are watches if they serve a function 
in relation to measuring time. Similarly, money is a functional kind 
because it is individuated by its role in human economy and not by in-
trinsic properties of objects that can play this role (paper, metal, digital 
currency, etc.). For this reason many functional kinds are taken to be 
non-reducible to natural kinds (Fodor 1974).
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A variation of essentialism in chemistry is microstructuralism, the 
view that microstructural properties make up the essence of chemical 
kinds. In the case of chemical elements this can be the nuclear struc-
ture, but it remains to be specifi ed what exactly this structure consists 
in, or, how to pinpoint what constitutes microstructural similarity. If 
we wish to focus on nuclear charge, for instance, then classifi cation ac-
cording to atomic number (i.e. the number of protons in the nucleus) 
will be relevant. On the other hand, if we focus on nuclear mass, then 
the number of neutrons will be relevant as well, and we will base a clas-
sifi cation on more fi ne-grained isotopes of elements. Or, we can classify 
substances by focusing on the patterns of radioactive decay and reach 
categories such as radionuclides which cross-cuts classifi cation into 
chemical elements. The possibility of different microstructural features 
being essences of different natural kinds opens up the question wheth-
er there is one correct division into kinds according to microstructural 
essences. This brings us to tenet (5) associated with essentialist views, 
namely that there is one correct way of dividing the world into natural 
kinds according to their essences, i.e. natural kind monism.
On the monistic view no cross-cutting classifi cations can be consid-
ered natural kinds. In case there is an overlap between natural kinds 
categories, one of them ought to be a subkind of the other. That is, 
there should be no cross-cutting categories. For instance, the category 
of ubiquitous organisms refers to organisms that can tolerate a wide 
range of environmental conditions and it comprises diverse organisms 
such as bacteria and fungi. However, it cross-cuts standard biological 
taxonomy according to which bacteria and fungi belong to different 
biological domains, bacteria comprising their own domain, and fungi 
belonging to the domain of eukaryotes. In such cases, the natural kind 
monist ought to conclude that at most one of the cross-cutting classifi ca-
tions represents a natural kind. The only overlap can happen between 
categories belonging to the same hierarchy where one is a subcategory 
of the other. For example, humans belong to the category Homo sapi-
ens, but also to the categories Mammal and Vertebrate, because Homo 
sapiens is a species belonging to a class of Mammals, and they both 
belong to subphylum Vertebrates.  This view is called a hierarchy thesis 
regarding natural kinds and it is often suggested as one of the criteria 
that natural classifi cations ought to fulfi ll (Bird and Tobin 2017). Mo-
nists who do not endorse the hierarchy thesis ought to claim that we 
can fi nd natural kinds only on the lowest level of classifi cations, and at 
that level there should be no overlap between kinds.
Essentialism is typically perceived as a monistic approach to natu-
ral kinds. This can be illustrated by Hilary Putnam’s view on natural 
kinds. His position can be qualifi ed as essentialist in the light of the 
fact that he defi nes natural kinds as consisting of individuals that bear 
sameness relation to the specifi ed paradigmatic exemplar of the kind. 
However, he also adds that the sameness relations we use to identify 
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natural kinds are interest relative. More concretely, he claims that, for 
instance, one thing holds the “same liquid” relation to something else 
if the two agree in important physical properties, where importance 
is an interest relative notion (Putnam 1975a). Thus, in our everyday 
contexts it is correct to say that water is H2O because for everyday con-
texts the important properties of water are captured by the compound 
H2O. But when we are doing chemistry then “the same liquid as” also 
refers to other molecular structure because water, beside H2O, consists 
of D2O, D4O2, D6O3, etc.
Ian Hacking (2015) argues that Putnam’s insistence on interest-
relativity of natural kinds commits him to the view that kinds lack 
essences. Hacking’s interpretation of Putnam is plausible if we assume 
that essentialist natural kinds ought to be fi xed categories that do not 
depend or change with our interests, and once we identify the kind’s 
essence we have clearly established the demarcating lines of that kind. 
The assumption is that neither demarcation nor essence is something 
that can change with our interests. I introduced Putnam’s view here 
exactly because he is usually considered as a typical proponent of es-
sentialism, which, by many interpretations, goes hand in hand with 
natural kind monism. Thus, Wilkerson (1993: 4, 5), when discussing 
and defending Putnam’s position against Dupre’s criticism says that 
it and other “doctrines of natural kinds” hold that “although there are 
many similarities and differences between things, one set of similari-
ties is privileged, because they are the real essences which determine 
natural kinds.” Commitment to monism is often not stated explicitly 
in the traditional essentialist views, but can be inferred from the fact 
that they typically endorse the hierarchy thesis (see for instance, Ellis 
2002).
On this reading essences ought to be somehow special or privileged 
properties, and once we identify them, we know what the uniquely ap-
propriate way of dividing the world into natural kind categories is. On 
the other hand, approaches that put emphasis on the importance of the 
fact that categories ought to serve our interests are pluralistic, because 
in different contexts and disciplines our interests can vary and with 
them the categories we deem natural. It seems highly unlikely that the 
view that puts focus on interest-relativity of groupings will arrive at a 
monistic division of natural kinds.
In section 4 I will discuss Devitt’s view as a type of pluralistic or pro-
miscuous essentialism, because he appears to allow for a wide range of 
interests to play a role in demarcating natural kinds. However, before 
engaging this issue I will argue that there is an important distinction 
between essentialist and cluster approaches to natural kinds and that 
Devitt’s view can be interpreted as essentialist with this distinction in 
mind.
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3. Essentialism vs. cluster kinds
The main argument against the traditional essentialism in philosophy 
of biology relied on the strictness of the requirement that all and only 
members of a kind should share an essence. Given the evolutionary 
history of different organisms, it is unlikely that we will fi nd such a 
property that is unique to kind members and that will provide grounds 
for biological classifi cation into species. In fact, according to this argu-
ment, even if there were such a property it would likely disappear from 
a population of organisms given the workings of evolutionary forces 
such as mutation, recombination or random drift (see, for example, 
Ereshefsky 2017, Okasha 2002).
Devitt (2008a), against this consensus in the philosophy of biology, 
claims to be resurrecting species essentialism. However, it is not clear 
what kind of essentialism he seems to be resurrecting. The aforemen-
tioned anti-essentialist consensus argues against species being defi ned 
by intrinsic essences and claims that species are defi ned by relational 
properties (some even argue for extrinsic or relational essentialism 
(see, for instance, Okasha 2002)). Take one of the more popular species 
concepts, for example, the Biological Species Concept (BSC) defi nes 
species as members of populations that can potentially interbreed. In 
this case, the potential to interbreed with other species members is a 
relational property which specifi es species membership, and not some 
intrinsic property that species members share. Devitt, on the other 
hand, claims that species members, and Linnean taxa in general, share 
at least some intrinsic properties and that species concepts are not en-
tirely relational. This, by itself does not seem suffi cient to establish an 
essentialist view. Anti-essentialists do not have to deny that species 
members can share some important intrinsic properties. Nonetheless, 
they put emphasis on variation between individuals given the opera-
tions of evolutionary processes, and, thus, claim that species are distin-
guished by “clusters of covarying [chromosomal and genetic] traits, not 
by shared essences” (Okasha 2002: 197). Devitt seems to endorse this 
view but gives it a different spin. He quotes exactly this statement by 
Okasha and adds that the clusters in question are exactly the essences 
he is talking about. This brings us to the interesting question about the 
relationship between essentialism and cluster approaches to natural 
kinds.
There are at least two possible ways to interpret this relationship, 
depending on how strictly we defi ne essentialism. We can identify es-
sences with necessary and suffi cient conditions for kind membership 
(Magnus 2012), which I take it corresponds to tenet (1) of essentialist 
views: all and only kind members possess a common essence. According 
to P. D. Magnus, and I tend to agree, this is the main feature of essen-
tialist accounts. In addition, Magnus claims that this criterion amounts 
to the assumption that natural kinds ought to have sharp boundaries, 
 Z. Brzović, Devitt’s Promiscuous Essentialism 299
i.e. be categorically distinct (Magnus 2012: 19). This means that for any 
individual entity, it must be clear whether it is a member of a certain 
kind or not.
An argument that has been worked out for the sharpness or cat-
egorical distinctness of essentialist natural kinds relies on the intu-
itions that natural kinds ought to pick out real features of the world. 
Accordingly, Brian Ellis (2001: 19, 20), for instance, argues that if nat-
ural kinds were continuous, and thus, not categorically distinct, then 
it would be up to us where to draw the line where one kind ends and 
another begins. This would make the delimitation of natural kinds a 
matter of convention, in opposition to essentialist claim that they are 
determined by real features of the world.
The cluster views were introduced exactly with the intention of ac-
commodating the fact that many natural kinds are not categorically 
distinct, and their aim was to work out a more encompassing account 
that would capture many actual scientifi c categories. Take the example 
of species, members of such kinds tend to share many common proper-
ties, but no property is unique to them. For instance, black stripes are 
characteristic of tigers. However, there are also tigers that do not have 
them. Accordingly, a specifi c property or a well-defi ned set of proper-
ties characteristic for a cluster kind is not a necessary condition for an 
entity to belong to that kind and thus natural kind boundaries can be 
vague. For instance, dogs and wolves have many similarities and they 
can have viable offspring. But, given their habitats, social structure 
and many other typical features it is not clear that it is useful to con-
sider them the same species or natural kind.
There is however, another interpretation of the relation between 
essentialism and cluster views that does not require essences to be 
unique, and natural kinds to be categorically distinct. By essence we 
can understand only that there are some facts about the world corre-
sponding to the unity of the kind, as one interpretation would suggest 
(Magnus 2012). On this reading, anyone who believes that there are 
natural kinds at all, thinks that they have this type of essences, and 
we end up with a position that is even more encompassing than cluster 
kinds view. This takes away signifi cance from essentialist views and 
merely equates them with positions holding that natural kinds ought 
to possess some unity that corresponds to some facts about the world. 
If we interpret Devitt as holding this view, then not much resurrect-
ing has been done on his part since cluster kinds accounts are popular 
in philosophy of biology (Boyd 1999; Griffi ths 1999; Robert A. Wilson, 
Barker, and Brigandt 2007).
We need to address the possibility, however, that Devitt has a 
different view of the consensus in philosophy of biology, and that he 
thinks cluster accounts of natural kinds are considered outdated or 
simply wrong. He talks about clustering views, i.e. the HPC view, as 
holding, as he does, that species have at least partly intrinsic essences. 
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But then he quotes Paul Griffi ths (1999)  as arguing that species have 
purely historical essences  which is then interpreted by Devitt as being 
incompatible with the HPC theory (Devitt 2008a). This is interesting 
since Griffi ths is standardly taken as a proponent of the HPC theory 
(see, for example, Ereshefsky 2017). Explaining Griffi ths’ view should 
help to make more precise the difference between clustering and es-
sentialist accounts.
Griffi ths (1999) argues that causal homeostatic mechanisms play 
the same role as essence plays in traditional essentialist accounts—
that is, on this new understanding, essence refers to the states of affairs 
that license induction and explanation within a theoretical category. 
Thus, for some types of scientifi c categories, the role of essence can be 
played by entirely extrinsic or relational properties. Griffi ths thinks 
that this is compatible with the HPC theory and offers the example of 
money. There can be indefi nitely many physical instances of money (or 
even non-physical ones) but the essence, i.e. the reason why all these 
instances are considered money is that they are recognized and evalu-
ated as such by the consumers, that is, by this relational property. 
When it comes to species, however, he claims that in addition to 
relational or historical essences, members need to share some intrinsic 
properties as well. This is clear when he talks about causal mecha-
nisms, such as developmental ones, responsible for, for example, prey 
detection in certain species of birds (Griffi ths 1999). Perhaps the best 
way to put it is to say that the extrinsic essence is responsible for the 
fact that species members share intrinsic properties as well. Griffi ths 
explains why kinds whose only essential properties are historical 
should be subjects of lawlike, counterfactual-supporting generaliza-
tions about morphological and physiological properties; because the 
principle of heredity acts as a kind of inertial force until some adaptive 
force acts to change that form (see his explanations of phylogenetic in-
ertia in support of this view (1999: 220)).  This is consistent with using 
phylogenetic relations as a species essence, for instance, Phylogenetic 
Species Concept (PSC) identifi es species as sets of organisms sharing 
a common ancestor. Another way that extrinsic essence can be respon-
sible for sharing intrinsic properties is by enabling the exchange and 
sharing of genetic material causing many of the shared traits (BSC spe-
cies concept limits species members to those that are able to exchange 
genetic material trough reproduction). I take it that the other propo-
nents of the so-called relational essentialism about species hold simi-
lar views. This is consistent with Mayr’s (1961) distinction between 
ultimate and proximate causation and the corresponding two sorts of 
explanation, which Devitt cites approvingly (Devitt 2008a: 353).
What is the difference, then, between relational essentialists2 and 
Devitt, if they also hold that species members need to have some in-
2 Griffi ths (1999), Okasha (2002) and LaPorte (2004) are taken as proponents of 
relational essentialism.
 Z. Brzović, Devitt’s Promiscuous Essentialism 301
trinsic properties in common, in addition to relational ones? I take it 
that proponents of such accounts do not call the intrinsic properties 
in question species’ essences, exactly because on traditional essential-
ist accounts, essences refer to necessary and suffi cient properties for 
species membership. While phylogenetic relationships can be taken as 
suffi cient and necessary conditions for belonging to a certain species on 
certain species concepts, it is not so easy (or it is perhaps impossible) 
to specify the necessary and suffi cient intrinsic properties that species 
members ought to share because of variation between them. In other 
words, while it is, at least on some species concepts, clear to what spe-
cies an organism belongs to, just from knowing a certain (important) 
relational property,3 this is not clear just from examining organism’s 
intrinsic properties. Thus, I take it that relational essentialism would 
agree that species members do share common clusters of properties 
(and they share them because of the relational essence), but we cannot 
specify any set of such properties that will be unique only to members 
of one species. If we wish to take Devitt’s view as arguing for some-
thing stronger than this, then he must be committed to the claim that 
we can delimit a set of necessary and suffi cient intrinsic properties for 
species members. Otherwise, it is not clear how intrinsic his biological 
essentialism is.
In the next section I attempt to characterize in more detail Devitt’s 
version of essentialism on the assumption that he does endorse intrin-
sic essentialism.4
4. Devitt’s promiscuous essentialism
As was illustrated in section 2, Putnam’s essentialism, which Devitt 
takes as paradigmatic essentialist view in contemporary philosophical 
debates and seems to rely upon in his own essentialist view, is plu-
ralistic, in opposition to the traditional essentialism. Pluralists about 
natural kinds hold that we can arrive at many different, cross-cutting 
classifi cations of the entities (and/or processes) in the world. Depend-
ing on what we are interested in, we will arrive at different classifi ca-
tory systems. For instance, if we are interested in patterns of radioac-
tive decay we will arrive at a classifi cation that cross-cuts the standard 
3 Be it that the organism shares a common ancestor with other members of that 
species or that it can interbreed with them, the reader can fi ll out here her favorite 
relational species concept if the concept allows for clear cut distinction between 
different species.
4 Perhaps his invoking of clusters has a different purpose; to point out that the 
essence of a species need not correspond to a crude idea that there is one gene that 
makes a tiger a member of the tiger species, for example. Thus, when he talks about 
clusters or patterns of properties and that the intrinsic essence does not need to be 
neat and tidy, he might have in mind the fact that essences can be very complex 
and comprise various properties that come together and make up a species. This is 
compatible with the view that essences are unique properties that all and only kind 
members share.
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chemical classifi cation into chemical elements, which is suitable for 
many other interests such as explaining material transformations. 
There is nothing inconsistent in claiming that we can have essential-
ist classifi cations that allow cross-cutting categories, if the essences in 
question are uniquely shared by members of the kind. For instance, 
category vitamin A is defi ned by its biological properties in a vitamin-
defi cient organism, but it consists of at least six vitamer chemicals that 
differ in their chemical structure, so the category cross-cuts standard 
chemical classifi cations. In this case, the specifi c biological activity of 
the vitamins can be considered as their essence, even though it does not 
correspond to the microstructural essence of the compounds compris-
ing the category.
Devitt allows for a vast range of categories to be considered essen-
tialist, and not just a limited set of basic physical, chemical or biological 
classifi cations. He shares the basic pluralist intuition that, depending 
on our interests, we might carve out the world differently and that 
different properties will make up essences of those kinds. This can be 
seen from the example he offers to support his claim that essences can 
be partly intrinsic and partly relational, or entirely relational. The es-
sence of being a pencil is partly determined by its relation to human 
intentions and partly by its physical properties, the essence of being 
Australian is entirely relational or extrinsic.
That there is a certain amount of terminological misunderstanding 
in this whole debate can be seen from the fact that Devitt’s essential-
ism, as interpreted here, is stating something very similar to Dupré’s 
promiscuous realism. Dupré, however argues against essentialism. His 
promiscuous realism is a claim that there are many sameness relations 
that can determine kind membership, and which ones will be taken as 
relevant will depend on our interests in various circumstances. He puts 
both scientifi c and every day or folk categories on equal footing in the 
sense that they all can be considered natural kinds. Devitt’s examples 
of essentialist kinds such as being Australian, or pencil, goes in the 
similar direction. Only, on my interpretation, his view should not al-
low vague boundaries between categories, while Dupré’s does. While 
this fulfi ls the minimal essentialist requirements, it downsizes the role 
of essences to a considerable degree. Essence was originally assumed 
to be important in grounding the explanatory success of natural kind 
categories. This is what Devitt relies on in his criticism of the anti-es-
sentialist consensus regarding species; he claims that being a member 
of a biological taxon ought to be explanatory.
If we take as core of essentialism the three main tenets (1)–(3), even 
these mentioned categories can fulfi l them. Accordingly, if the catego-
ries ‘pencil’ and ‘being Australian’ are defi ned strictly enough, this cri-
terion will yield clearly demarcated categories where all and only mem-
bers of a kind share an essential property. For example, if we defi ne 
pencils as instruments for writing that consist of a solid pigment core 
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inside a protective casting, and if the defi nition is strict enough, we will 
have a clearly delineated category of writing instruments where all 
members share an essential property. Also, that essence will be respon-
sible for (some) traits associated with that category members (tenet 2), 
and by identifying it we can explain and predict properties of category 
members (tenet 3).
With regards to biological classifi cations Devitt says he defends the 
doctrine of intrinsic biological essentialism, according to which Linne-
an taxa have, at least partly, underlying intrinsic properties. Linnean 
taxa are not just species, which are standardly taken as candidates for 
natural kinds, they also include all categories in the Linnean hierarchy 
such as kingdoms, phyla, classes, orders, families and genera. Take the 
example of the kingdom Archaeplastidans, they are characterized by 
having plastids—chloroplasts that carry out photosynthesis and are 
derived from captured cyanobacteria. If this is a feature of all the or-
ganisms classifi ed in this kingdom, we can take it to be the essence of 
that category.
It is questionable whether there is such a feature for all the taxo-
nomic ranks, but I take it that an essentialist about taxonomic ranks 
must argue that there is such a feature. A poten tial problem with such 
an approach is that, while it is compatible with tenet (1) of essentialist 
views, it is questionable to what degree it can be taken to fulfi ll tenets 
(2) and (3). Namely, the fact that all Archaeplastidans have plastids is 
responsible for some of their shared traits, but there is also much di-
vergence in other traits of these organisms. For instance, they can vary 
from being isolated cells to colonies and multi-celled organisms. Thus, 
such categories have a very limited predictive and explanatory value. 
To use another, more familiar example, how explanatory is the cat-
egory of vertebrate? It is taken to comprise all species with a backbone, 
but it includes such diverse organisms as Fire salamander, Saltwater 
crocodile and House sparrow. Knowing that an organism is a member 
of this category is minimally explanatory because all it can explain is 
a few facts about the most general features of its body plan. If we wish 
to provide an account of natural kinds as explanatory categories, then 
either the essence should be some very important property that causes 
many other properties of kind members, or, the essence is not what 
makes such categories explanatory in the fi rst place.
Even more extreme case is Devitt’s own example of ‘being Austra-
lian’ as a relational or extrinsic essentialist category. While this might 
formally be considered as an essentialist category, the minimal number 
of characteristics of category members that the essence (however we 
might specify it) is responsible for, has next to zero explanatory and 
predictive value, which can make us wonder whether it is justifi ed to 
call these essentialist categories. While a certain amount of pluralism 
surely is compatible with essentialism, regardless of this not being the 
traditional approach to essentialism, this type of promiscuous essen-
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tialism seems to go too far, which can make us reconsider it as an es-
sentialist view.
Admittedly, it is not clear whether Devitt himself would consider 
all the aforementioned essentialist categories as natural kinds, since 
he thinks that natural kinds need to be explanatory signifi cant (Devitt 
2008b). Now, he says that explanatory signifi cance comes in degrees, 
but we might agree that the kind ‘being Australian’ has next to zero 
explanatory value and can therefore be excluded from the category of 
natural kinds. If Devitt wants a way out of this type of promiscuous es-
sentialism, he needs to offer a criterion, based on which we can decide 
what categories are fulfi lling the explanatoriness requirement. When 
he talks about ‘carving nature at its joints’ Devitt mentions that kinds 
of entities posited by a scientifi c theory ought to play a causally sig-
nifi cant role but does not elaborate further on how to recognize and 
delineate such causally signifi cant roles.
Traditionally, essences fulfi lled that function. Recognizing a kind’s 
essence allows us to establish that kind as genuinely explanatory and 
the essence in question is what grounds this explanatoriness. If, how-
ever, essences are downsized to such a degree that even ‘being Austra-
lian’ can be an essentialist kind, then essence no longer plays the same 
role. Let us go back to the example of species, how can we tell that 
Canis lupus familiaris plays a causally signifi cant role, or possesses 
an essence? It appears that Devitt’s response is that it must possess 
it, because it is obviously explanatorily signifi cant, and, consequently, 
it is the job of working biologists to fi nd specifi c essences of particular 
species. This seems like it inverts what the main upshot of essentialism 
was supposed to be; that fi nding an essence will provide the grounding 
for the explanatoriness of natural kind categories. If we start out by 
stating that certain categories are obviously explanatory and conclude 
from this that they must possess an essence, then we have no criterion 
of how to distinguish genuinely explanatory categories from the ones 
that are not explanatory, other than some common-sense estimation. 
This strategy can easily lead into the promiscuous variety of essential-
ism.
5. Conclusion
I have analyzed Devitt’s version of essentialism and its relation to the 
traditional essentialism and the cluster accounts of natural kinds. I 
have argued that his variety of essentialism is either too promiscuous, 
or, he needs to offer a criterion of what makes natural kinds genuinely 
explanatory in opposition to any everyday classifi cations that share 
some common property. While traditionally in essentialist views, es-
sence was supposed to play that role, Devitt’s downsized notion of an 
essence appears unsuitable for it.
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